NorvilleBarnes
Footballguy
My favorite thread in months.
True. However, on the other side, (not the short one ), Stalin used the two years to rebuild his officer corp, which had been devastated in the purges. He also improved his armaments immensely, perhaps most importantly in the development of the T-34 tank. This led to the strategic and tactical defeat of the Germans at Kursk, the greatest tank battle in history, after which the German Army was in almost constant retreat. As happens with all hypothetical situations, there are two sides to the story. I am not sure that the eventual defeat of Germany would have happened had it not been for the Nazi Soviet Pact.If Germany should prove to be victorious, she will leave the war too weakened to start a war with the USSR within a decade at least. She will have to supervise the occupation of France and England and to prevent their restoration/restore herself.
In addition, a victorious Germany will have vast colonies/territories; the exploitation of those and their adaptation to German methods will also absorb Germany during several decades.
Obviously, this Germany will be too busy elsewhere to turn against us. There is one additional thing that will strengthen our safety. In a conquered France, the French Communist Party will always be very strong. A Communist revolution will unavoidably break out, and we will be able to exploit the situation and to come to the aid of France and make her our ally. In addition, all the nations that fall under the "protection" of a victorious Germany will become our allies. This presents for us a broad field of action for the initiation of world revolution.
This last part of Stalin's speech is amazingly short sided. He was seriously deluding himself.
Col Hans-Ulrich Rudel (519 tank kills in the Ju-87) would beg to differ on this point. Yes the Stuka was used poorly as a light/medium bomber (cross channel) BUT it was extremely effective in tank-busting/ground support (eastern front) until the very end of the war. Obviously tactics had to change to support these low/slow flyers BUT it was still effective when thoughtfully employed despite its obsolescense.The demise of the Stuka was more about the fact that it was a sitting duck without air superiority. Further, advances in anti-air mobile batteries caused great causalities. Basically, about mid way through the war the Stuka was just obsolete machines and were being replaced by ####e-Wulf Fw 190's for ground support.We'll probably get to this more in detail next summer, when the Battle of Britain will hopefully be discussed in greater detail. From my limited understanding, the balloons had cables connected, and some had explosives. But they weren't really all that effective anyhow. There are greater reasons why the Germans did not attempt dive bombing against the British- the Stuka had a limited range that really didn't make it effective across the Channel.Explain barrage balloons to me. I know they were to prevent low-level flight of enemy planes, but in the pictures I've seen of them deployed, it looks like you could just fly in amongst them.
My uncle went ashore at Omaha Beach on D-Day +2. He was an MP. He survived the war, came home, and was killed in a farm accident a year or so before I was born.In addition to Sea Bass, if any of you have family personal stories, it would be great to hear them.
My grandfather on my mother's side worked at Lockheed all during the war as a purchasing agent. My other grandfather was a concentration camp survivor.
My wife's grandfather served in the United States Navy aboard the US Lexington and survived being sunk in the Coral Sea. I also have a great uncle who was captured on Bataan and survived the Death March.
I agree it was shameful. However, there was a very strong "peace at any price" mentality in England, as there was in the US. Rapturous crowds greeted Chamberlain on his return. I don't think the world appreciated then the voracious appetite that Hitler had for more conquest, and they thought that appeasing him would satisfy the beast. Churchill, and others, saw it for what it was. An act of moral cowardice.The British and French Guarantee of Poland
In order to understand why the British and French attempts to reach a treaty with Russia failed, we first have to examine why they chose to guarantee the integrity of Poland, which led to the outbreak of the war in the first place. Like most actions of the western powers leading up to the war, it was an act of complete and utter ineptitude.
The year before, England and France could have gone to war with Czechoslovakia as allies. The Czechs had a fine small army, a mountain range separating it from Germany that would be difficult to conquer. The Czechs were on good terms with the Russians, and would likely have allowed Russian troops to help defend them. Finally, German generals have testified that Hitler would have been overthrown if he had tried to invade the Sudetenland (Northern Czechoslovakia). This last is questionable- who knows if the generals would have really revolted or would have been successful?
But Nevile Chamberlain, to his eternal shame, decided it would be better to negotiate with Hitler and give up the Sudetenland in return for a piece of paper in which Hitler promised not to invade the rest of Czechoslavkia. Chamberlain returned from the Munich Agreement as a great hero among the British people- they did not realize what he had given up for his temporary peace. In March of 1939, Hitler broke his agreement and invaded Prague, and occupied the rest of Czechoslavakia. Chamberlain was outraged, and in his anger he decided to guarantee Hitler's next target: Poland.
Unlike the Czechs, Poland was militarily indefensible. One reason it has been invaded at least a dozen times in it's chaotic history is that the land there is mostly flat. The rivers are easily crossable. Worse, the Poles were not only anti-German but incredibly anti-Russian as well. They refused to even consider the idea of Russian troops entering Poland to help defend them against the Germans. Which of course led to the first question the Russians asked the British and French delegations when they arrived in July, 1939- how to form an alliance, when the Poles won't even let the Russians help?
Chamberlain hated the Russians, didn't think their help was valuable at all, and only sent diplomats there because Parliament pressured him into it. Diplomatic papers released several years after the war reveal that his instructions were: go slow, refuse to answer any specific questions about the Poles, refuse to agree to anything that would commit British forces, reveal nothing about British troops. This is not the way to achieve an alliance!
Don't really have much in the way of stories, but my mom grew up in Germany, including the war years. She was the second oldest of 8 (born 1930) and spent the war years helping feed and take care of her family. The oldest brother was killed in Action somewhere in Africa. Her dad was a blacksmith, and died a few years after the war ended from health issues from working conditions in the factories.In addition to Sea Bass, if any of you have family personal stories, it would be great to hear them.
Your whole premise is faulty. Stalin did understand that Germany was going to attack. It was just a matter of when. He did not trust the British or French to come to his aid precisely because they gave up so easily on the Sudetenland. He also knew that the British did not want to go to war and Hitler was attempting to strike a peace accord with them.The sole reason he signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact was to buy time. He also bought land in Poland. As you previously stated, Guderian thought that the land given up by Germany in Poland was the reason they did not reach Moscow.The Nazi Soviet Pact Part 4
I shall now make my argument why Stalin's decision to reach a truce with Hitler was the worst foreign policy decision in world history. It's actually a very simple argument. Had Stalin read Mein Kampf or ever listened to Hitler's speeches, he would have realized that Hitler's ultimate goal was the destruction of Russia in order to make it a slave state for Germans to control. Apparently, Stalin did not understand this.
Not entirely true as the Russian Army was not prepared to fight Hitler and they knew it.The Nazi-Soviet Pact Part One
This was by far the most shocking agreement in world history. Hitler's entire career had centered upon a vicious attack on Bolshevism. The main support among Western Europeans was based upon the Nazis providing a bulwark against the threat of international Communism. According to National Socialism, there was no difference between Communism and Judiasm.
More importantly was the geopolitical aims of the Nazi regime. Mein Kampf very clearly states that Germany cannot survive on the land it currently owned: so long as it was dependent on other powers to provide it's food and energy supplies, it would always, at least in Hitler's mind, be subservient to those powers. The answer, Hitler states, is Lebensraum, land in the east, mainly at the expense of Russia. Any peace treaty with Russia would work against this aim, which is why most experts at the time were sure it would never happen.
If the pact was surprising for Hitler, it was even more surprising for Stalin. From the beginning of the Nazi regime, the Soviets had been making overtures towards Britain and France for an alliance against Hitler. Stalin was terrified of the Germans. British and French diplomats were in Moscow in July of 1939, trying to make this happen. Why it failed, and why world history completely changed in a matter of days, I will discuss in more detail later on.
This is all very true. I would suggest anyone interested in WWII read this book - When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Modern War Studies) http://www.amazon.com/When-Titans-Clashed-...7306&sr=1-9Gives a view of the war that most people in the West know nothing about and what the war on eastern front was like. The western front is really a side show compared to the fighting in the east.Your whole premise is faulty. Stalin did understand that Germany was going to attack. It was just a matter of when. He did not trust the British or French to come to his aid precisely because they gave up so easily on the Sudetenland. He also knew that the British did not want to go to war and Hitler was attempting to strike a peace accord with them.The sole reason he signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact was to buy time. He also bought land in Poland. As you previously stated, Guderian thought that the land given up by Germany in Poland was the reason they did not reach Moscow.The Nazi Soviet Pact Part 4
I shall now make my argument why Stalin's decision to reach a truce with Hitler was the worst foreign policy decision in world history. It's actually a very simple argument. Had Stalin read Mein Kampf or ever listened to Hitler's speeches, he would have realized that Hitler's ultimate goal was the destruction of Russia in order to make it a slave state for Germans to control. Apparently, Stalin did not understand this.
Given these facts, it is quite possible that the Nazi-Soviet pact is what saved the Soviet Union and won the war for the Allies.
Please! Do we have to wait that long?The Polish Military in 1939
After being divided up throughout it's history between Germany, Russia, and the Ukraine, Poland became an independent state in 1916, for the first time in 300 years, at the whim of the League of Nations. The Polish leaders demanded access to the sea, so they were given the port of Gdansk (Danzig in German) which effectively cut the main part of Germany off from east Prussia. This made the Germans furious and in fact was the impetus for the outbreak of the war.
Poland was an idiotic state. Their first action upon becoming independent was to attack Russia, even though they didn't have anywhere near the military manpower. After a bloody three year conflict in which nothing was accomplished, a truce (never a peace) was established. The Polish state was formed as a Republic, but very soon its first president, Pilsudski, ended all elections and formed a dictatorship. Upon his death in 1935, a group of military colonels took over. They did nothing to improve the terrible conditions of the country: 5% Paris, 95% Ukraine. No middle class to speak of, except perhaps the three and half million Jews, who were roundly hated by most of the rest of the population and under severe restriction and taxation. Because of their military, the Polish colonels considered themselves a world power and haughtily made treaties and alliances as if they were.
The military was 2 million strong, one of the largest on Earth. In the elite position were the gallant Ulany, at that time the greatest calvary men in existence. They would have been an asset to any any army that fought, say, in the Civil War. They were brave to the extreme. Unfortunately technology and industrialized warfare had moved past them, but they did not realize it. They did not believe it. Their commanders told these men in August of 1939 that the German tanks were made of paper mache.
Military experts advised the Poles in August of 1939 to pull back behind the Vistula River and defend central Poland. This would allow the French time to invade from the west. (These experts did not concieve the French might not attack; neither did the Poles.) The Poles refused to consider giving up any part of Poland to the enemy. Instead, they arrayed their troops all along the borders with Germany. If the Germans attacked (which they doubted), the plan was they would immediately counter-attack, and Polish troops would be in Berlin before German troops reached Warsaw. After all, this is what Napoleon would have done!
Next month we shall see how effective this plan turned out...
I think it is hard to know if it is a bad decision, good decision or one that doesn't change anything. So what if he doesn't sign the pact. Hitler probably still invades Poland and what does Russia do - join the West to stop him or let the all of Poland fall to Germany. Do you think Hitler goes to War to protect Poland? I personally don't think so since England can't raise a large Army at this point and France is sitting behind the Maginot line. So Poland falls quickly and then France and much of the West and then Russia is invaded about the sametime.In the end I don't think it really changes anything.timschochet said:Obviously, Christo and I disagree about whether or not the Nazi-Soviet Pact was a good decision for Stalin. I have stated my reasons. There are many books that disagree with my position, and there are many books that agree with my position as well. This issue is one of the most hotly debated regarding World War II. I would say that a small majority of military experts would tend to side with Christo's viewpoint on this, though my viewpoint has no lack of defenders, including William L. Shirer, Allan Bullock, and Martin Gilbert, all famed historians of the era.
Tirpitz down?Some comments added.timschochet said:The German military in August 1939
Heading into the war, the Germans were ill-prepared for it. In fact, most of the general staff of the Wehrmacht army wanted another 2-3 years to build up their numbers of tanks and artillery. Yet at the same time they were more prepared than all of the others.
Army
The Wehrmacht had over a million men at arms, fanatically loyal to the German state and with a high moral factor. They believed (and continued to believe throughout most of the war) that they would not lose under Hitler, which is always a key element to success in combat. As we shall see, they had some of the most brilliant military minds ever to live in charge of their affairs, including Heinz Guderian, who is of special note here. It was Guderian who conceived the idea of massing tanks together and using their speed to attack ahead of the main force. His book, Achtung, Panzer! in the early 1930's related this idea. Others came up with similar plans: J.C. Fuller in England, and Charles De Gaulle in France, but they were rejected by the military leaders of those states. Guderian's plan was accepted by Hitler. Combined with coordinated air attacks, the tank attacks would form the Blitzkrieg, "Lightning War" which would so dominate the first few years of the war.
If I am not mistaken, in addition to the Wehrmacht which reported up through a chain of command to the German General Staff, there were the various SS armies with an entirely different command structure. The differences in mission between the Wehrmacht and the SS was a major operational problem. I also believe that outside of specialized panzer units, the rest of the Wehrmacht was unmechanized, continuing to rely on horse drawn transport.
Air Force
From 1933 onwards Hitler had spared no expense building up his air force. By 1935 he had achieved air parity with Britain and never looked back. Three planes dominated the Luftwaffe- the Stuka, already discussed, which was a nod to the American dive bomber but adapted to land battles, and the Messerschmidt fighters and bombers, which were much better made planes. There were four weaknesses to the Luftwaffe, which would eventually be revealed in the war:
1. The Messerschmidts, fine as they were, were not as maneveuerable as the airplanes they would eventually face in the Royal Aif Force (Spitfires and Hurricanes).
2. The Germans entered the war with too few pilots (about 1,500). By 1943 most of these were dead, and the level of air combat was severely lowered.
3. The British had radar, the Germans did not. The Germans entered the war unaware of this technology.
4. Worst of all, the commander of the Luftwaffe was Hermann Goering. Although he had been an air war hero himself in the FIrst World War, Goering had nothing in common with the brilliant professional minds of the German General Staff. He was a miltary idiot, a bombastic amateur, as he would demonstrate time and again. All of the other weaknesses I mentioned could have been overcome, but not this one.
The other major problem of the Luftwaffe was that they never developed a 4 engine long range bomber or a heavy transport plane. There was nothing like the B-17 or B-24 or the Lancaster. So during the Battle of Britian, the Luftwaffe was bombing from two engine planes or single engine Stukas, which had limited range and limited payloads. This is one of the reasons that the V-1s and V-2s were developed because they were a better way to bomb England.
Navy
The Germans entered the war with a vastly inferior navy to England and France. They did have a few pocket battleships (including the Graf Spee) and one major battleship (The Bismarck) under construction, but they could not hope to equal their enemies in ability or numbers. What they did have was U-Boats (submarines). In 1918 these nearly toppled the British Empire by destroying all shipping, and now they threatened to do the same. The U-Boats had some brilliant commanders under the overal command of Admiral Doenitz. Unfortunatly, there were too few: 54 operational in August of 1939. Doenitz pleaded with Hitler to wait a year to begin the war, at which point he might have over 80 operational U-Boats, but this was not to be. Throughout the war, Doenitz never felt he had enough U-Boats and always fought with the other armed services for the allocation of resources.
It was still effective when there was no Allied airpower or ground units had no anti-aircraft batteries but it took heavy losses in the later half of the war due to it being basically too slow. The same elements that made it a great dive bomber early was what made it obsolete later in the war. The high drag of its wings, which allowed for more control at lower speeds, made it a hopeless case against enemy fighter planes or AAA.I am not talking about its ill use in the Battle of Britain (although the Stuka would have been the perfect weapon of choice if the Luftwaffe had decided to first focus on the radar installations of the British instead of ignoring them) but rather the later part of the war. They were still used and could be effective against armor and other vehicles but it is a documented fact that they increasingly took heavier losses. Units were switched to Fw 190 and even Me 109's. Stuka's served to the end of the war but they had long ago seen their zenith.SpecOpLoad said:Col Hans-Ulrich Rudel (519 tank kills in the Ju-87) would beg to differ on this point. Yes the Stuka was used poorly as a light/medium bomber (cross channel) BUT it was extremely effective in tank-busting/ground support (eastern front) until the very end of the war. Obviously tactics had to change to support these low/slow flyers BUT it was still effective when thoughtfully employed despite its obsolescense.Chadstroma said:The demise of the Stuka was more about the fact that it was a sitting duck without air superiority. Further, advances in anti-air mobile batteries caused great causalities. Basically, about mid way through the war the Stuka was just obsolete machines and were being replaced by ####e-Wulf Fw 190's for ground support.timschochet said:We'll probably get to this more in detail next summer, when the Battle of Britain will hopefully be discussed in greater detail. From my limited understanding, the balloons had cables connected, and some had explosives. But they weren't really all that effective anyhow. There are greater reasons why the Germans did not attempt dive bombing against the British- the Stuka had a limited range that really didn't make it effective across the Channel.Flying V said:Explain barrage balloons to me. I know they were to prevent low-level flight of enemy planes, but in the pictures I've seen of them deployed, it looks like you could just fly in amongst them.
The command structure mess was more of a later war phenom than it was in 1939. Up to and including the invasion of Poland, the SS units counted as a few regiments that were largely within the overall Wehrmacht command. It was later in the war that you had a command structure that was insane. Not only did the Wehrmacht, SS, Luftwaffe all have separate command structures but the Panzer divisions in western Europe were directly under the Fuhrer. That lead to the famous moment on D-Day that Hitler was not to be woken up and the Panzer units sat and waited as the Allies gained a beach head in Normandy.If I am not mistaken, in addition to the Wehrmacht which reported up through a chain of command to the German General Staff, there were the various SS armies with an entirely different command structure. The differences in mission between the Wehrmacht and the SS was a major operational problem. I also believe that outside of specialized panzer units, the rest of the Wehrmacht was unmechanized, continuing to rely on horse drawn transport.
The French army was thought to be the best army in Europe at the time. The logical conclusion for Stalin is that France would defeat Germany.timschochet said:The Nazi Soviet Pact Part 4
By agreeing to the Pact, Stalin allowed his best defense against the German threat, the French army, to be eliminated in a one front struggle while he watched and waited. When Germany invaded in 1941, Stalin was alone.
And if it hadn't been for you, they probably would have.The French army was thought to be the best army in Europe at the time. The logical conclusion for Stalin is that France would defeat Germany.timschochet said:The Nazi Soviet Pact Part 4
By agreeing to the Pact, Stalin allowed his best defense against the German threat, the French army, to be eliminated in a one front struggle while he watched and waited. When Germany invaded in 1941, Stalin was alone.
Obviously Stalin did not take into account that the French Army was.... well.... French. (sorry, could not resist)The French army was thought to be the best army in Europe at the time. The logical conclusion for Stalin is that France would defeat Germany.timschochet said:The Nazi Soviet Pact Part 4
By agreeing to the Pact, Stalin allowed his best defense against the German threat, the French army, to be eliminated in a one front struggle while he watched and waited. When Germany invaded in 1941, Stalin was alone.
Really, it was nothing...timschochet said:The German military in August 1939
As we shall see, they had some of the most brilliant military minds ever to live in charge of their affairs, including Heinz Guderian, who is of special note here. It was Guderian who conceived the idea of massing tanks together and using their speed to attack ahead of the main force. His book, Achtung, Panzer! in the early 1930's related this idea. Others came up with similar plans: J.C. Fuller in England, and Charles De Gaulle in France, but they were rejected by the military leaders of those states. Guderian's plan was accepted by Hitler. Combined with coordinated air attacks, the tank attacks would form the Blitzkrieg, "Lightning War" which would so dominate the first few years of the war.
Except for the Einsatzgruppen which were always under SS command. In May 1939, Adolf Hitler decided upon an invasion of Poland planned for August 25 of that year (later moved back to September 1). In response, Heydrich again re-formed the Einsatzgruppen to travel in the wake of the German armies. Unlike the earlier operations, Heydrich gave the Einsatzgruppen commanders carte blanche to kill anyone belonging to groups that the Germans considered hostile. After the occupation of Poland in 1939, the Einsatzgruppen killed Poles belonging to the upper class and intelligentsia, such as priests and teachers.[6] The mission of the Einsatzgruppen was therefore the forceful depoliticisation of the Polish people and the elimination of the groups most clearly identified with the Polish national identity. As stated by Hitler in his Armenian quote, units were sent: "...with orders for them to send to death mercilessly and without compassion, men, women, and children of Polish race and language. Only in this way can we obtain the living space we need."[7] "Whatever we find in the shape of an upper class in Poland will be liquidated," Hitler had declared.[8]The command structure mess was more of a later war phenom than it was in 1939. Up to and including the invasion of Poland, the SS units counted as a few regiments that were largely within the overall Wehrmacht command. It was later in the war that you had a command structure that was insane. Not only did the Wehrmacht, SS, Luftwaffe all have separate command structures but the Panzer divisions in western Europe were directly under the Fuhrer. That lead to the famous moment on D-Day that Hitler was not to be woken up and the Panzer units sat and waited as the Allies gained a beach head in Normandy.If I am not mistaken, in addition to the Wehrmacht which reported up through a chain of command to the German General Staff, there were the various SS armies with an entirely different command structure. The differences in mission between the Wehrmacht and the SS was a major operational problem. I also believe that outside of specialized panzer units, the rest of the Wehrmacht was unmechanized, continuing to rely on horse drawn transport.
You're assuming that he believed what he was saying.timschochet said:If Germany should prove to be victorious, she will leave the war too weakened to start a war with the USSR within a decade at least. She will have to supervise the occupation of France and England and to prevent their restoration/restore herself.
In addition, a victorious Germany will have vast colonies/territories; the exploitation of those and their adaptation to German methods will also absorb Germany during several decades.
Obviously, this Germany will be too busy elsewhere to turn against us. There is one additional thing that will strengthen our safety. In a conquered France, the French Communist Party will always be very strong. A Communist revolution will unavoidably break out, and we will be able to exploit the situation and to come to the aid of France and make her our ally. In addition, all the nations that fall under the "protection" of a victorious Germany will become our allies. This presents for us a broad field of action for the initiation of world revolution.
This last part of Stalin's speech is amazingly short sided. He was seriously deluding himself.
We haven't really gone in depth on what was happening between the Soviets, French, British and Poles. The Poles flat-out refused to allow Soviet troops into Poland. Stalin asked the British how many troops it would commit to the defense of Poland and was told they could send TWO divisions.Plus, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg had refused to allow the French to go through their countries to attack Germany from the west. So even if the French had the balls to do it, they would have had to have attacked the Seigfried line. It should be noted that the French didn't attack Germany even after war was declared.I think it is hard to know if it is a bad decision, good decision or one that doesn't change anything. So what if he doesn't sign the pact. Hitler probably still invades Poland and what does Russia do - join the West to stop him or let the all of Poland fall to Germany. Do you think Hitler goes to War to protect Poland? I personally don't think so since England can't raise a large Army at this point and France is sitting behind the Maginot line. So Poland falls quickly and then France and much of the West and then Russia is invaded about the sametime.In the end I don't think it really changes anything.timschochet said:Obviously, Christo and I disagree about whether or not the Nazi-Soviet Pact was a good decision for Stalin. I have stated my reasons. There are many books that disagree with my position, and there are many books that agree with my position as well. This issue is one of the most hotly debated regarding World War II. I would say that a small majority of military experts would tend to side with Christo's viewpoint on this, though my viewpoint has no lack of defenders, including William L. Shirer, Allan Bullock, and Martin Gilbert, all famed historians of the era.
Einsatzgruppen were not combat units so I would not consider them part of the command structure for the German Army in as much as it meant to the war effort. Hitler loved to pit his Generals against each other and had multiple levels of agencies or groups within the military, SS and Gestapo that would do the same or similar missions. It was a SOP of Hitler that continued and lead to the insane command structure of the German military effort against the Normandy invasion that contributed to the success of the Allies creating a western front.Except for the Einsatzgruppen which were always under SS command. In May 1939, Adolf Hitler decided upon an invasion of Poland planned for August 25 of that year (later moved back to September 1). In response, Heydrich again re-formed the Einsatzgruppen to travel in the wake of the German armies. Unlike the earlier operations, Heydrich gave the Einsatzgruppen commanders carte blanche to kill anyone belonging to groups that the Germans considered hostile. After the occupation of Poland in 1939, the Einsatzgruppen killed Poles belonging to the upper class and intelligentsia, such as priests and teachers.[6] The mission of the Einsatzgruppen was therefore the forceful depoliticisation of the Polish people and the elimination of the groups most clearly identified with the Polish national identity. As stated by Hitler in his Armenian quote, units were sent: "...with orders for them to send to death mercilessly and without compassion, men, women, and children of Polish race and language. Only in this way can we obtain the living space we need."[7] "Whatever we find in the shape of an upper class in Poland will be liquidated," Hitler had declared.[8]The command structure mess was more of a later war phenom than it was in 1939. Up to and including the invasion of Poland, the SS units counted as a few regiments that were largely within the overall Wehrmacht command. It was later in the war that you had a command structure that was insane. Not only did the Wehrmacht, SS, Luftwaffe all have separate command structures but the Panzer divisions in western Europe were directly under the Fuhrer. That lead to the famous moment on D-Day that Hitler was not to be woken up and the Panzer units sat and waited as the Allies gained a beach head in Normandy.If I am not mistaken, in addition to the Wehrmacht which reported up through a chain of command to the German General Staff, there were the various SS armies with an entirely different command structure. The differences in mission between the Wehrmacht and the SS was a major operational problem. I also believe that outside of specialized panzer units, the rest of the Wehrmacht was unmechanized, continuing to rely on horse drawn transport.
Hence the "Phony War" period.We haven't really gone in depth on what was happening between the Soviets, French, British and Poles. The Poles flat-out refused to allow Soviet troops into Poland. Stalin asked the British how many troops it would commit to the defense of Poland and was told they could send TWO divisions.Plus, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg had refused to allow the French to go through their countries to attack Germany from the west. So even if the French had the balls to do it, they would have had to have attacked the Seigfried line. It should be noted that the French didn't attack Germany even after war was declared.I think it is hard to know if it is a bad decision, good decision or one that doesn't change anything. So what if he doesn't sign the pact. Hitler probably still invades Poland and what does Russia do - join the West to stop him or let the all of Poland fall to Germany. Do you think Hitler goes to War to protect Poland? I personally don't think so since England can't raise a large Army at this point and France is sitting behind the Maginot line. So Poland falls quickly and then France and much of the West and then Russia is invaded about the sametime.In the end I don't think it really changes anything.timschochet said:Obviously, Christo and I disagree about whether or not the Nazi-Soviet Pact was a good decision for Stalin. I have stated my reasons. There are many books that disagree with my position, and there are many books that agree with my position as well. This issue is one of the most hotly debated regarding World War II. I would say that a small majority of military experts would tend to side with Christo's viewpoint on this, though my viewpoint has no lack of defenders, including William L. Shirer, Allan Bullock, and Martin Gilbert, all famed historians of the era.
Even Churchill admitted that what Stalin did was pragmatic given the way France and Britain acted.Hence the "Phony War" period.We haven't really gone in depth on what was happening between the Soviets, French, British and Poles. The Poles flat-out refused to allow Soviet troops into Poland. Stalin asked the British how many troops it would commit to the defense of Poland and was told they could send TWO divisions.Plus, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg had refused to allow the French to go through their countries to attack Germany from the west. So even if the French had the balls to do it, they would have had to have attacked the Seigfried line. It should be noted that the French didn't attack Germany even after war was declared.I think it is hard to know if it is a bad decision, good decision or one that doesn't change anything. So what if he doesn't sign the pact. Hitler probably still invades Poland and what does Russia do - join the West to stop him or let the all of Poland fall to Germany. Do you think Hitler goes to War to protect Poland? I personally don't think so since England can't raise a large Army at this point and France is sitting behind the Maginot line. So Poland falls quickly and then France and much of the West and then Russia is invaded about the sametime.In the end I don't think it really changes anything.timschochet said:Obviously, Christo and I disagree about whether or not the Nazi-Soviet Pact was a good decision for Stalin. I have stated my reasons. There are many books that disagree with my position, and there are many books that agree with my position as well. This issue is one of the most hotly debated regarding World War II. I would say that a small majority of military experts would tend to side with Christo's viewpoint on this, though my viewpoint has no lack of defenders, including William L. Shirer, Allan Bullock, and Martin Gilbert, all famed historians of the era.
The biggest reason for the success of the Western front is the fact that Germany had over 200 hundred divisions committed to the Eastern front and only 50 in france and 20 in Italy. Just double the number of troops in France and Normandy invasion could have easily gone a different way.Einsatzgruppen were not combat units so I would not consider them part of the command structure for the German Army in as much as it meant to the war effort. Hitler loved to pit his Generals against each other and had multiple levels of agencies or groups within the military, SS and Gestapo that would do the same or similar missions. It was a SOP of Hitler that continued and lead to the insane command structure of the German military effort against the Normandy invasion that contributed to the success of the Allies creating a western front.Except for the Einsatzgruppen which were always under SS command. In May 1939, Adolf Hitler decided upon an invasion of Poland planned for August 25 of that year (later moved back to September 1). In response, Heydrich again re-formed the Einsatzgruppen to travel in the wake of the German armies. Unlike the earlier operations, Heydrich gave the Einsatzgruppen commanders carte blanche to kill anyone belonging to groups that the Germans considered hostile. After the occupation of Poland in 1939, the Einsatzgruppen killed Poles belonging to the upper class and intelligentsia, such as priests and teachers.[6] The mission of the Einsatzgruppen was therefore the forceful depoliticisation of the Polish people and the elimination of the groups most clearly identified with the Polish national identity. As stated by Hitler in his Armenian quote, units were sent: "...with orders for them to send to death mercilessly and without compassion, men, women, and children of Polish race and language. Only in this way can we obtain the living space we need."[7] "Whatever we find in the shape of an upper class in Poland will be liquidated," Hitler had declared.[8]The command structure mess was more of a later war phenom than it was in 1939. Up to and including the invasion of Poland, the SS units counted as a few regiments that were largely within the overall Wehrmacht command. It was later in the war that you had a command structure that was insane. Not only did the Wehrmacht, SS, Luftwaffe all have separate command structures but the Panzer divisions in western Europe were directly under the Fuhrer. That lead to the famous moment on D-Day that Hitler was not to be woken up and the Panzer units sat and waited as the Allies gained a beach head in Normandy.If I am not mistaken, in addition to the Wehrmacht which reported up through a chain of command to the German General Staff, there were the various SS armies with an entirely different command structure. The differences in mission between the Wehrmacht and the SS was a major operational problem. I also believe that outside of specialized panzer units, the rest of the Wehrmacht was unmechanized, continuing to rely on horse drawn transport.
Poland was sort of a warm-up period for them while they got their policies and procedures worked out. However, their role wasn't "minor" if you were a Polish parish priest or a Polish army officer in September 1939. IIRC, Karol Józef Wojtyła, barely escaped during this time.The Einsatzgruppen (Special Actions Groups) role in Poland and western Europe was somewhat minor. Their really infamous activities came with the invasion of Russia in June, 1941.
Sorry Christo, this is not true. In The Gathering Storm, Churchill is sharply critical of Stalin over the Nazi-Soviet Pact. He calls it over and over a terrible mistake, which led to the invasion of Russia two years later. You can disagree with this view all you want, but Churchill is definitely on my side in this one.Even Churchill admitted that what Stalin did was pragmatic given the way France and Britain acted.
You're right; I shouldn't have used that word.Poland was sort of a warm-up period for them while they got their policies and procedures worked out. However, their role wasn't "minor" if you were a Polish parish priest or a Polish army officer in September 1939. IIRC, Karol Józef Wojtyła, barely escaped during this time.The Einsatzgruppen (Special Actions Groups) role in Poland and western Europe was somewhat minor. Their really infamous activities came with the invasion of Russia in June, 1941.
Great thread!Ok, on my mother's side, I have two uncles who served during the war. One was a dentist in the Navy. He was the dentist aboard the U.S.S. Arizona. Wound up shipping out just a few months before the attack on Pearl Harbor. He survived the war and passed away at a ripe old age.timschochet said:In addition to Sea Bass, if any of you have family personal stories, it would be great to hear them.
My grandfather on my mother's side worked at Lockheed all during the war as a purchasing agent. My other grandfather was a concentration camp survivor.
My wife's grandfather served in the United States Navy aboard the US Lexington and survived being sunk in the Coral Sea. I also have a great uncle who was captured on Bataan and survived the Death March.
If Hitler had just released the divisions at Calais things might have been different.The biggest reason for the success of the Western front is the fact that Germany had over 200 hundred divisions committed to the Eastern front and only 50 in france and 20 in Italy. Just double the number of troops in France and Normandy invasion could have easily gone a different way.
Even with the resources given to the western front, the Germans could have potentially have been able to repel the Normandy invasion. Even as is, the Normandy invasion was very fragile in its success. A number of things contributed to the success of Normandy. Such things as Operation Fortitude were vital to the success of the invasion of Normandy. Another, as I pointed out earlier, was the inefficient and ineffective command structure of German forces on the Western front which lead to the crucial withholding of the Panzer division reserves to counter attack. These are only a small example of the numerous things that added up to the history we know but you can not discount the impact that the German dysfunctional command structure contributed to the success of the Normandy invasion and thus the Western Front.The biggest reason for the success of the Western front is the fact that Germany had over 200 hundred divisions committed to the Eastern front and only 50 in france and 20 in Italy. Just double the number of troops in France and Normandy invasion could have easily gone a different way.Einsatzgruppen were not combat units so I would not consider them part of the command structure for the German Army in as much as it meant to the war effort. Hitler loved to pit his Generals against each other and had multiple levels of agencies or groups within the military, SS and Gestapo that would do the same or similar missions. It was a SOP of Hitler that continued and lead to the insane command structure of the German military effort against the Normandy invasion that contributed to the success of the Allies creating a western front.Except for the Einsatzgruppen which were always under SS command. In May 1939, Adolf Hitler decided upon an invasion of Poland planned for August 25 of that year (later moved back to September 1). In response, Heydrich again re-formed the Einsatzgruppen to travel in the wake of the German armies. Unlike the earlier operations, Heydrich gave the Einsatzgruppen commanders carte blanche to kill anyone belonging to groups that the Germans considered hostile. After the occupation of Poland in 1939, the Einsatzgruppen killed Poles belonging to the upper class and intelligentsia, such as priests and teachers.[6] The mission of the Einsatzgruppen was therefore the forceful depoliticisation of the Polish people and the elimination of the groups most clearly identified with the Polish national identity. As stated by Hitler in his Armenian quote, units were sent: "...with orders for them to send to death mercilessly and without compassion, men, women, and children of Polish race and language. Only in this way can we obtain the living space we need."[7] "Whatever we find in the shape of an upper class in Poland will be liquidated," Hitler had declared.[8]The command structure mess was more of a later war phenom than it was in 1939. Up to and including the invasion of Poland, the SS units counted as a few regiments that were largely within the overall Wehrmacht command. It was later in the war that you had a command structure that was insane. Not only did the Wehrmacht, SS, Luftwaffe all have separate command structures but the Panzer divisions in western Europe were directly under the Fuhrer. That lead to the famous moment on D-Day that Hitler was not to be woken up and the Panzer units sat and waited as the Allies gained a beach head in Normandy.If I am not mistaken, in addition to the Wehrmacht which reported up through a chain of command to the German General Staff, there were the various SS armies with an entirely different command structure. The differences in mission between the Wehrmacht and the SS was a major operational problem. I also believe that outside of specialized panzer units, the rest of the Wehrmacht was unmechanized, continuing to rely on horse drawn transport.
Every war is filled with "what ifs".Why did Hitler stop the encirclement at Dunkirk, allowing about 300,000 troops to escape back to Britain?If Hitler had just released the divisions at Calais things might have been different.The biggest reason for the success of the Western front is the fact that Germany had over 200 hundred divisions committed to the Eastern front and only 50 in france and 20 in Italy. Just double the number of troops in France and Normandy invasion could have easily gone a different way.