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Should Dan Campbell have kicked a FG in the 2nd Half of the NFCC? (1 Viewer)

Should Campbell have tried for a FG in the 2nd Half of the NFCC?

  • Yes

    Votes: 119 76.3%
  • No

    Votes: 37 23.7%

  • Total voters
    156
This thread is a mess. But a serious question for the analytics hounds in here - Could you provide the data that shows going for it was the right call? Based on what? I'm looking for details outside of TD > FG. I'm truly interested.
This was posted earlier: https://forums.footballguys.com/thr...the-2nd-half-of-the-nfcc.811879/post-24837066

Is that what you're looking for? Or something more detailed?
Thanks. That's something, but i was looking for something more detailed. The entire argument in this thread is based on one twitter user, "4th Down Decision Bot"? What actually goes into creating those #'s? Is it just 4th and 3 % vs. FG %? Does it take into account a Badgley vs. Tucker vs. avg NFL kicker? Does it take into account kicking on grass vs. turf, indoor vs outdoor, likelihood of a penalty, etc., SF kick block likelihood vs. say Chicago special teams vs NFL avg? SF special teams prowess as of week 20 vs. week 1 vs. SF avg all year? <-- And that's just the "simple" FG. A 4th down play has many more variables. And higher-level, does it take into account up 3 possessions vs. 2 possessions? Time remaining? Quality of both teams Off/Def/STs? Quality of coaching? Weather? Ref crew tendencies?

I won't mention the "M" word.:-)

Yes, I'm looking for something a bit more definitive, but thanks for this first link.
 
To have a decent debate, some things have to be understood by all parties. When they're not understood (like big momentum swings being a factor in winning football games), you get the type of debate we have now, LOL.

No offense to anyone, but I don't see a way to continue this responsibly (with certain parties, anyway).

Agreed. One should have a basic understanding of probability, data science, etc. to add anything to this discussion. Otherwise it gets muddied up by people making vague generalizations based on their gut, which is useless for all involved.
I am not great with statistics and probability and it sounds like you do it for a living, so please correct me if I am wrong on what I am thinking.... One coin flip has a 50/50 chance of landing on either side. No matter how many times you flip the coin, each instance is 50/50 even if heads landed the last 10 times in a row the probability would still be 50/50 on the next flip, but we all know that at some point over the # of times you flip it, it will come back to approximately 50/50 and tails would need to run at some point....regression to the mean. positive or negative.

analytics say that the individual plays on 4th down in question are approximate 50/50's . The Lions have been clipping along at a 70% rate of success for the season. The NFL average more closely mirrors the 50/50.... DO you believe that the lions were "due" a regression to the mean??? or is that baked into the analytics for said plays??

Game theory statistics is what professional gamblers excel at to create favorable "conditions" for themselves... I am sure that Lions have a Game Theory/Analytics specialist on their staff and his/her name is not Dan Campbell...
 
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Anything's measurable if it's well-defined. That's problem A - people use the term "momentum" to vaguely refer to certain circumstances whenever it's convenient for them. There's no definition of what momentum is. It's just a feeling people have sometimes that comes and then - more importantly - goes without notice. Like I said earlier, you have momentum until suddenly you don't. The Lions had all the momentum. Then they lost.

Once you define it, then there would absolutely be value in measuring it. Maybe you'd even find that it IS predictive of future success. That would be a really cool and valuable finding. All the attempts that I'm aware of have failed to do so.
It’s a form of human emotion that can be changed by what happen during the game, giving the team that possesses it an added boost of positive energy. That is my definition of momentum. Of course you can’t measure it.

Well that sounds extremely measurable. We have enormous sets of play-by-play and tracking data that tells us what happen during the game, so we should easily be able to see that when teams make good plays, they gain momentum, which presumably makes them more likely to be successful on subsequent plays. Except it turns out that's not what happens. :kicksrock:
Then knock yourself out and get back to us with the results.
 
In order to effectively move on to the 2nd part of this (which is the initial question posed), I do believe we need an agreeable definition of momentum for all (or most).

Most are in the same realm with different variances.
 
In order to effectively move on to the 2nd part of this (which is the initial question posed), I do believe we need an agreeable definition of momentum for all (or most).

my definition of momentum -

It’s a form of human emotion that can be changed by what happen during the game, giving the team that possesses it an added boost of positive energy.
 
Anything's measurable if it's well-defined. That's problem A - people use the term "momentum" to vaguely refer to certain circumstances whenever it's convenient for them. There's no definition of what momentum is. It's just a feeling people have sometimes that comes and then - more importantly - goes without notice. Like I said earlier, you have momentum until suddenly you don't. The Lions had all the momentum. Then they lost.

Once you define it, then there would absolutely be value in measuring it. Maybe you'd even find that it IS predictive of future success. That would be a really cool and valuable finding. All the attempts that I'm aware of have failed to do so.
It’s a form of human emotion that can be changed by what happen during the game, giving the team that possesses it an added boost of positive energy. That is my definition of momentum. Of course you can’t measure it.

Well that sounds extremely measurable. We have enormous sets of play-by-play and tracking data that tells us what happen during the game, so we should easily be able to see that when teams make good plays, they gain momentum, which presumably makes them more likely to be successful on subsequent plays. Except it turns out that's not what happens. :kicksrock:
Then knock yourself out and get back to us with the results.
It’s your silly theory, not mine. You’re gonna have to get out of the recliner and do your own legwork here.
 
Anything's measurable if it's well-defined. That's problem A - people use the term "momentum" to vaguely refer to certain circumstances whenever it's convenient for them. There's no definition of what momentum is. It's just a feeling people have sometimes that comes and then - more importantly - goes without notice. Like I said earlier, you have momentum until suddenly you don't. The Lions had all the momentum. Then they lost.

Once you define it, then there would absolutely be value in measuring it. Maybe you'd even find that it IS predictive of future success. That would be a really cool and valuable finding. All the attempts that I'm aware of have failed to do so.
It’s a form of human emotion that can be changed by what happen during the game, giving the team that possesses it an added boost of positive energy. That is my definition of momentum. Of course you can’t measure it.

Well that sounds extremely measurable. We have enormous sets of play-by-play and tracking data that tells us what happen during the game, so we should easily be able to see that when teams make good plays, they gain momentum, which presumably makes them more likely to be successful on subsequent plays. Except it turns out that's not what happens. :kicksrock:
Then knock yourself out and get back to us with the results.
It’s your silly theory, not mine. You’re gonna have to get out of the recliner and do your own legwork here.
I don’t care, but you seem to care a lot
 
Rewatched the 4th quarter of the game today. Both Reynolds drops were bad but the last one was especially brutal. Right in the bread basket. Goff couldn’t have thrown it any better.

Biggest mistake was the run on 3rd down at the goal line. Campbell said he thought Monty would walk it in but he had 3 WRs on the field which isn’t exactly a goal line, run friendly formation.

After rewatching, hard to criticize since the play was executed well and Reynolds just dropped it, BUT going up 3 scores would have been huge there. Still think he should have kicked it.
 

You're still doing the thing. The human factor could be overwhelmingly important. It could be also be the kind of meaningless apophenia humans are constantly falling for. If you think you can prove the former, just do it. Or don't, if you're worried it would be a waste of your time.

I'll take this part to mean we agree it could be important enough to sway against the analytics. So now we just have to determine if those was one of those times. Let me present an argument for why I think it was.

Let's start with the first FG opportunity: Up 14, halfway through the second half, SF just scored FG:

Analytics say (correct me if I'm wrong): Slightly favors going for it, in line with Campbell's mentality and coaching style, chance to go up by more, or kill more clock and have easier-to-make-FG.

The human factor:
* Purdy is not a 4th-quarter-comeback guy (none in the regular season, small one previous week vs Packers).
* Shanahan is not a 4th-quarter-comeback coach (none more than five points since he's been head coach of the team before last week's seven).
* The pressure is on them at home, to finally break through to the SB after so much failure, and they're losing. Every point of difference helps encourage them to abandon the run (and their biggest weapon).
* SF wasted 25 percent of their remaining time (half a quarter) getting a FG, which you could negate instantly.
* Ravens proved SF can collapse at home, and they beat them kicking four FGs (they took the points over and over again). This team is not built to come back from leads, so an extra three means more against Purdy than against, say, Mahomes a couple years ago, when they routinely did it (including the SB against the 49ers).
* SF took the field goal, but obviously wanted a TD being down by 17. They didn't have much more confidence than they did at halftime. A FG could extinguish the little smoke of positivity before it turned into a fire.
* Ravens have Tucker at kicker, and the Lions have Badgely (human factor could actually sway toward going for it here instead of what the Ravens did).

So, against Purdy and Shanahan, who can't seem to come back from more than one score later in the game, in that situation, I think the above is enough to sway a close "go for it" to a clear "take the points." You might disagree, but at least we agree the human factor could have been overwhelmingly important. I'd be interested to hear why you think the above was either incorrect, or not enough to sway.
 

You're still doing the thing. The human factor could be overwhelmingly important. It could be also be the kind of meaningless apophenia humans are constantly falling for. If you think you can prove the former, just do it. Or don't, if you're worried it would be a waste of your time.

I'll take this part to mean we agree it could be important enough to sway against the analytics. So now we just have to determine if those was one of those times. Let me present an argument for why I think it was.

Let's start with the first FG opportunity: Up 14, halfway through the second half, SF just scored FG:

Analytics say (correct me if I'm wrong): Slightly favors going for it, in line with Campbell's mentality and coaching style, chance to go up by more, or kill more clock and have easier-to-make-FG.

The human factor:
* Purdy is not a 4th-quarter-comeback guy (none in the regular season, small one previous week vs Packers).
* Shanahan is not a 4th-quarter-comeback coach (none more than five points since he's been head coach of the team before last week's seven).
* The pressure is on them at home, to finally break through to the SB after so much failure, and they're losing. Every point of difference helps encourage them to abandon the run (and their biggest weapon).
* SF wasted 25 percent of their remaining time (half a quarter) getting a FG, which you could negate instantly.
* Ravens proved SF can collapse at home, and they beat them kicking four FGs (they took the points over and over again). This team is not built to come back from leads, so an extra three means more against Purdy than against, say, Mahomes a couple years ago, when they routinely did it (including the SB against the 49ers).
* SF took the field goal, but obviously wanted a TD being down by 17. They didn't have much more confidence than they did at halftime. A FG could extinguish the little smoke of positivity before it turned into a fire.
* Ravens have Tucker at kicker, and the Lions have Badgely (human factor could actually sway toward going for it here).

So, against Purdy and Shanahan, who can't seem to come back from more than one score later in the game, in that situation, I think the above is enough to sway a close "go for it" to a clear "take the points." You might disagree, but at least we agree the human factor could have been overwhelmingly important. I'd be interested to hear why you think the above was either incorrect, or not enough to sway.
I’ve made a few these arguments here (and others have too), I don’t think this sways him.

Until momentum and I guess human elements are defined and everyone agrees on the definition, we’re in a doom loop here. That’s kind of where I was going earlier.

FWIW, I agree with a lot of this and made some of these arguments about 5 pages ago. I don’t expect anyone to go reading through it though, so it’s not on you.
 

You're still doing the thing. The human factor could be overwhelmingly important. It could be also be the kind of meaningless apophenia humans are constantly falling for. If you think you can prove the former, just do it. Or don't, if you're worried it would be a waste of your time.

I'll take this part to mean we agree it could be important enough to sway against the analytics. So now we just have to determine if those was one of those times. Let me present an argument for why I think it was.

Let's start with the first FG opportunity: Up 14, halfway through the second half, SF just scored FG:

Analytics say (correct me if I'm wrong): Slightly favors going for it, in line with Campbell's mentality and coaching style, chance to go up by more, or kill more clock and have easier-to-make-FG.

The human factor:
* Purdy is not a 4th-quarter-comeback guy (none in the regular season, small one previous week vs Packers).
* Shanahan is not a 4th-quarter-comeback coach (none more than five points since he's been head coach of the team before last week's seven).
* The pressure is on them at home, to finally break through to the SB after so much failure, and they're losing. Every point of difference helps encourage them to abandon the run (and their biggest weapon).
* SF wasted 25 percent of their remaining time (half a quarter) getting a FG, which you could negate instantly.
* Ravens proved SF can collapse at home, and they beat them kicking four FGs (they took the points over and over again). This team is not built to come back from leads, so an extra three means more against Purdy than against, say, Mahomes a couple years ago, when they routinely did it (including the SB against the 49ers).
* SF took the field goal, but obviously wanted a TD being down by 17. They didn't have much more confidence than they did at halftime. A FG could extinguish the little smoke of positivity before it turned into a fire.
* Ravens have Tucker at kicker, and the Lions have Badgely (human factor could actually sway toward going for it here instead of what the Ravens did).

So, against Purdy and Shanahan, who can't seem to come back from more than one score later in the game, in that situation, I think the above is enough to sway a close "go for it" to a clear "take the points." You might disagree, but at least we agree the human factor could have been overwhelmingly important. I'd be interested to hear why you think the above was either incorrect, or not enough to sway.

I have to admit, with the way you entered the discussion I was expecting something a lot better. This is just more of the same. :kicksrock: I could similarly make a bullet list of "human" reasons it clearly made sense to go for it. I won't, because that would be a waste of time, which I thought we were hoping to avoid.

(I did like how Purdy, who is like 22-4 for his career, "is not a 4th-quarter-comeback guy." I've heard a lot of criticisms of him, but that's a new one!)
 
Anything's measurable if it's well-defined. That's problem A - people use the term "momentum" to vaguely refer to certain circumstances whenever it's convenient for them. There's no definition of what momentum is. It's just a feeling people have sometimes that comes and then - more importantly - goes without notice. Like I said earlier, you have momentum until suddenly you don't. The Lions had all the momentum. Then they lost.

Once you define it, then there would absolutely be value in measuring it. Maybe you'd even find that it IS predictive of future success. That would be a really cool and valuable finding. All the attempts that I'm aware of have failed to do so.
It’s a form of human emotion that can be changed by what happen during the game, giving the team that possesses it an added boost of positive energy. That is my definition of momentum. Of course you can’t measure it.

Well that sounds extremely measurable. We have enormous sets of play-by-play and tracking data that tells us what happen during the game, so we should easily be able to see that when teams make good plays, they gain momentum, which presumably makes them more likely to be successful on subsequent plays. Except it turns out that's not what happens. :kicksrock:
Then knock yourself out and get back to us with the results.
It’s your silly theory, not mine. You’re gonna have to get out of the recliner and do your own legwork here.
I don’t care, but you seem to care a lot
You sure keep popping up in my notifications a lot for someone who claims to not care. Maybe time to give your brain a rest for a while.
Turn off notifications when someone quotes you or replies. I did that years ago. I don’t feel the need to reply to every post, but you obviously do.
 
Anything's measurable if it's well-defined. That's problem A - people use the term "momentum" to vaguely refer to certain circumstances whenever it's convenient for them. There's no definition of what momentum is. It's just a feeling people have sometimes that comes and then - more importantly - goes without notice. Like I said earlier, you have momentum until suddenly you don't. The Lions had all the momentum. Then they lost.

Once you define it, then there would absolutely be value in measuring it. Maybe you'd even find that it IS predictive of future success. That would be a really cool and valuable finding. All the attempts that I'm aware of have failed to do so.
It’s a form of human emotion that can be changed by what happen during the game, giving the team that possesses it an added boost of positive energy. That is my definition of momentum. Of course you can’t measure it.

Well that sounds extremely measurable. We have enormous sets of play-by-play and tracking data that tells us what happen during the game, so we should easily be able to see that when teams make good plays, they gain momentum, which presumably makes them more likely to be successful on subsequent plays. Except it turns out that's not what happens. :kicksrock:
Then knock yourself out and get back to us with the results.
It’s your silly theory, not mine. You’re gonna have to get out of the recliner and do your own legwork here.
I don’t care, but you seem to care a lot
You sure keep popping up in my notifications a lot for someone who claims to not care. Maybe time to give your brain a rest for a while.
Turn off notifications when someone quotes you or replies. I did that years ago. I don’t feel the need to reply to every post, but you obviously do.

Yet you keep responding...

Thanks for the tech tips, pops. 👍
 
I actually thought we were getting somewhere too :kicksrock:

I saw the post and I made the same arguments, I knew what the response was going to be. If we had defined momentum and agreed upon it, we could’ve gone in for the close.

Now nobody is on the other side of this.
 

You're still doing the thing. The human factor could be overwhelmingly important. It could be also be the kind of meaningless apophenia humans are constantly falling for. If you think you can prove the former, just do it. Or don't, if you're worried it would be a waste of your time.

I'll take this part to mean we agree it could be important enough to sway against the analytics. So now we just have to determine if those was one of those times. Let me present an argument for why I think it was.

Let's start with the first FG opportunity: Up 14, halfway through the second half, SF just scored FG:

Analytics say (correct me if I'm wrong): Slightly favors going for it, in line with Campbell's mentality and coaching style, chance to go up by more, or kill more clock and have easier-to-make-FG.

The human factor:
* Purdy is not a 4th-quarter-comeback guy (none in the regular season, small one previous week vs Packers).
* Shanahan is not a 4th-quarter-comeback coach (none more than five points since he's been head coach of the team before last week's seven).
* The pressure is on them at home, to finally break through to the SB after so much failure, and they're losing. Every point of difference helps encourage them to abandon the run (and their biggest weapon).
* SF wasted 25 percent of their remaining time (half a quarter) getting a FG, which you could negate instantly.
* Ravens proved SF can collapse at home, and they beat them kicking four FGs (they took the points over and over again). This team is not built to come back from leads, so an extra three means more against Purdy than against, say, Mahomes a couple years ago, when they routinely did it (including the SB against the 49ers).
* SF took the field goal, but obviously wanted a TD being down by 17. They didn't have much more confidence than they did at halftime. A FG could extinguish the little smoke of positivity before it turned into a fire.
* Ravens have Tucker at kicker, and the Lions have Badgely (human factor could actually sway toward going for it here instead of what the Ravens did).

So, against Purdy and Shanahan, who can't seem to come back from more than one score later in the game, in that situation, I think the above is enough to sway a close "go for it" to a clear "take the points." You might disagree, but at least we agree the human factor could have been overwhelmingly important. I'd be interested to hear why you think the above was either incorrect, or not enough to sway.
I think that’s a pretty reasonable argument. I’ve made it clear from the jump that I wouldn’t have had a problem with Campbell kicking in any of the situations. The only things I’ve pushed back against were the arguments that a) it was obviously the wrong call to go for it and b) the reason it was wrong is because of a hazily defined concept of “momentum” that, as with most momentum arguments, amounts to post hoc ergo propter hoc
 
Psychological momentum is real, and it is spectacular.


- Psychological momentum (PM) is conceptualized as a perceptual phenomenon that changes human behavior and performance. It is “experienced as a psychological force in which several factors or qualities converge in a synergistic way to enable one to perform at a level not ordinarily possible

- A long research tradition suggests that psychological momentum (PM) plays a critical role in goal pursuit and achievement.

- The phenomenon is ubiquitous, ranging from doing household chores to trading stocks, driving in traffic, winning Presidential primaries, and beating opponents in sports.

- PM, of course, works both ways (positively and negatively).

- This efficiency principle of PM means that whatever tasks people undertake, perceptions of positive PM enhance their sense of success in goal pursuit. When they initially experience success, their self-confidence and competence grow, leading to heightened expectations, expanded mental and physical effort in task performance, increased perceptions of positive PM, and a greater likelihood of success

- Having gained positive momentum, task performance is perceived as easier and smoother, but when the task has to be restarted it becomes more demanding and difficult, often leading to negative emotions.

- If individuals see themselves as strong performers technically, physically, and mentally (confidence, competence, and attributions to ability), and simultaneously perceive themselves being superior over the opponent on the three factors (skills, mind, and stamina), their subjective probability of success grows appreciably. This altered state of mind not only makes PM possible but likely.

- “Underdogs” win because of newly found psychological resources, particularly PM, not because of a sudden increase in fixed ability.

- If “ability” were the only or even critical factor, elite performers would never “choke”

- The interplay between conscious and nonconscious processes is evident when PM is perceptually lost and in the worst case, allowed to turn into negative PM. In this situation, performers relegate the guiding and enabling power of nonconscious processing back to their conscious mind as they start losing confidence in themselves as performers and thus begin consciously steering once-automatic movements, increasing the likelihood of serious negative consequences.

 
Psychological momentum is real, and it is spectacular.


- Psychological momentum (PM) is conceptualized as a perceptual phenomenon that changes human behavior and performance. It is “experienced as a psychological force in which several factors or qualities converge in a synergistic way to enable one to perform at a level not ordinarily possible

- A long research tradition suggests that psychological momentum (PM) plays a critical role in goal pursuit and achievement.

- The phenomenon is ubiquitous, ranging from doing household chores to trading stocks, driving in traffic, winning Presidential primaries, and beating opponents in sports.

- PM, of course, works both ways (positively and negatively).

- This efficiency principle of PM means that whatever tasks people undertake, perceptions of positive PM enhance their sense of success in goal pursuit. When they initially experience success, their self-confidence and competence grow, leading to heightened expectations, expanded mental and physical effort in task performance, increased perceptions of positive PM, and a greater likelihood of success

- Having gained positive momentum, task performance is perceived as easier and smoother, but when the task has to be restarted it becomes more demanding and difficult, often leading to negative emotions.

- If individuals see themselves as strong performers technically, physically, and mentally (confidence, competence, and attributions to ability), and simultaneously perceive themselves being superior over the opponent on the three factors (skills, mind, and stamina), their subjective probability of success grows appreciably. This altered state of mind not only makes PM possible but likely.

- “Underdogs” win because of newly found psychological resources, particularly PM, not because of a sudden increase in fixed ability.

- If “ability” were the only or even critical factor, elite performers would never “choke”

- The interplay between conscious and nonconscious processes is evident when PM is perceptually lost and in the worst case, allowed to turn into negative PM. In this situation, performers relegate the guiding and enabling power of nonconscious processing back to their conscious mind as they start losing confidence in themselves as performers and thus begin consciously steering once-automatic movements, increasing the likelihood of serious negative consequences.

I believe that momentum exists, especially at an individual level (the famed “flow state”). What I’m skeptical of is that it can be factored prospectively into decision making: I should do this because it will give my team positive momentum, or I shouldn’t do something because it could give my opponents negative momentum.

The interplay between human actions and psychological reactions is incredibly complex, and I don’t believe we have nearly as much ability to manipulate those reactions as most people believe. Instead, I think we look backwards and use momentum to fill in gaps. The team lost after X happened, therefore they lost because X happened, therefore decision makers should have taken steps to avoid X happening. It makes sense at a surface level, but when you dig a little deeper the logic falls apart
 
I believe that momentum exists, especially at an individual level (the famed “flow state”). What I’m skeptical of is that it can be factored prospectively into decision making: I should do this because it will give my team positive momentum, or I shouldn’t do something because it could give my opponents negative momentum.

The interplay between human actions and psychological reactions is incredibly complex, and I don’t believe we have nearly as much ability to manipulate those reactions as most people believe. Instead, I think we look backwards and use momentum to fill in gaps. The team lost after X happened, therefore they lost because X happened, therefore decision makers should have taken steps to avoid X happening. It makes sense at a surface level, but when you dig a little deeper the logic falls apart
So then are you skeptical of Campbell's primary reason for his 4th down decisions? Because in his own words they were prospectively made in large part to gain momentum. Not analytics.

“I just felt really good about us converting, getting our momentum, and not letting them play long ball,” Campbell said.
 
Of course momentum is a factor in sports, especially big swings. Football being on the more intense end of the momentum spectrum.

Also, while Campbell ultimately did the one thing he couldn’t do to get the 9ers back in the game with the 24-10 FG situation, the score, alone, should’ve raised serious doubts as to whether to go for it.

You got scoreboard, Dan, and you’re well on your way to winning this game. Makeable FG, 3 scores up, take what the football gods are giving you there. Life is good. Absolutely no need to do something off schedule.

The other one wasn’t so bad. I could live with it. The one in question is ugly. Take it down a notch, Dan…you don’t have to kneecap people to win.
 
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I believe that momentum exists, especially at an individual level (the famed “flow state”). What I’m skeptical of is that it can be factored prospectively into decision making: I should do this because it will give my team positive momentum, or I shouldn’t do something because it could give my opponents negative momentum.

The interplay between human actions and psychological reactions is incredibly complex, and I don’t believe we have nearly as much ability to manipulate those reactions as most people believe. Instead, I think we look backwards and use momentum to fill in gaps. The team lost after X happened, therefore they lost because X happened, therefore decision makers should have taken steps to avoid X happening. It makes sense at a surface level, but when you dig a little deeper the logic falls apart
So then are you skeptical of Campbell's primary reason for his 4th down decisions? Because in his own words they were prospectively made in large part to gain momentum. Not analytics.

“I just felt really good about us converting, getting our momentum, and not letting them play long ball,” Campbell said.
Kind of? I don't know the full context of the quote, but if Campbell was saying that he went for it specifically because he thought converting would give his team a boost and demoralize the Niners, that would be bad process regardless of whether it was the right decision.

But I don't think that's what he was saying. I think he was using the word more as a figure of speech. The Lions offense had been dominating SF and he wanted to keep it going.

Now let me turn the question around to you: If we assume that momentum exists, why wouldn't that generally argue in favor of a choice with a greater than 50% chance of success? Let's say the Lions had a 60% chance of converting that fourth down. That would mean they also had a better than even chance that they would come away from the play with positive momentum and the Niners would be demoralized, and a lower percentage chance that the reverse would happen.
 

Now let me turn the question around to you: If we assume that momentum exists, why wouldn't that generally argue in favor of a choice with a greater than 50% chance of success? Let's say the Lions had a 60% chance of converting that fourth down. That would mean they also had a better than even chance that they would come away from the play with positive momentum and the Niners would be demoralized, and a lower percentage chance that the reverse would happen.
I would say it comes down to expected values.

Choice 1: 60% x "value of going for it" = (first down + some increased probability of getting touchdown or shorter FG - some probability of future turnover) = ??

Choice 2: 78% x "value of FG" = (2.3 pts + value of 3-score game)

The biggest problem, however, is that while the 78% FG success rate is relatively reliable, the "60% chance" figure is not even close to reliable IMO. It depends FAR too much and is influenced by game situation/flow, quality of play call, specific defense playing against, etc.

Which is of course where the "intuition" factors into the decision-making process.

Obviously Campbell's mental math for the 3Q 4th down said Choice 1 > (2.4 pts + value of 3-score game). Mine wouldn't
 
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ETA: What I wrote is a framework so hopefully people won't try to get all anal and nit-picky regarding the formulas and specific numbers.
 

Now let me turn the question around to you: If we assume that momentum exists, why wouldn't that generally argue in favor of a choice with a greater than 50% chance of success? Let's say the Lions had a 60% chance of converting that fourth down. That would mean they also had a better than even chance that they would come away from the play with positive momentum and the Niners would be demoralized, and a lower percentage chance that the reverse would happen.
I would say it comes down to expected values.

Choice 1: 60% x "value of going for it" = (first down + some increased probability of getting touchdown or shorter FG - some probability of future turnover) = ??

Choice 2: 78% x "value of FG" = (2.3 pts + value of 3-score game)

The biggest problem, however, is that while the 78% FG success rate is relatively reliable, the "60% chance" figure is not even close to reliable IMO. It depends FAR too much and is influenced by game situation/flow, quality of play call, specific defense playing against, etc.

Which is of course where the "intuition" factors into the decision-making process.

Obviously Campbell's mental math for the 3Q 4th down said Choice 1 > 2.4 pts. Mine wouldn't
That's fine, but all you did was come up with a slightly different version of the model. I actually think the analytics are the least interesting part of this whole discussion, because they are mostly inconclusive. As you say, there's always a large margin of error for these things, so if the model says it's 50/50, it might actually be 55/45 or 45/55. The only time that analytics are really interesting is when the model definitively recommends doing something that's counterintuitive. (If it's not counterintuitive, then it's equally uninteresting. The "model" will tell you that you should go for it if there are five seconds left and you're down by 4, but you don't need a model to tell you that because duh). But if the model tells you to go for two after scoring to make it an eight-point game, that goes against everything we thought we knew from a lifetime of watching football, yet it's unambiguously the right decision (60/40 by the numbers).

Anyway, back to my point: we weren't arguing about analytics or intuition. You were saying that momentum exists, and my point was that, even if it did, why would it argue in favor of one decision or another, since any decision you make could cause some sort of momentum swing?

Which really goes to my larger complaint, which is that it's not enough to do a bunch of hand waving around "You have to consider other factors" without specifying exactly why those other factors would push against a certain decision. For example, if the model says you should kick but your kicker just got flattened by a meteor, well, that's certainly a factor that should overcome any generalized mathematical recommendation. More realistically, @Neil Beaufort Zod's post above cited some specific factors that argued in favor of Campbell playing it more conservatively.

But more frequently, what I see is people working backward to rationalize a belief that has been drummed into them by decades of watching football. Everyone knows you take the points, so when someone doesn't do that you search for reasons to "prove" that they're wrong. Citing momentum doesn't actually prove anything, it's just a convenient argument that can be folded into whatever shape is needed
 
Here's an interesting question: Regardless of what you think Campbell should have done in the two fourth-down situations, which of the two do you think had a stronger case to go for it?

I heard someone arguing today that the first one was more questionable, which is funny because I had the exact opposite view.

First of all, that was my gut reaction in the moment: Up 14, keep your foot on the gas. Down three, tie the game up. But thinking about it a couple days later, I feel like the supposed psychological barrier of going up three scores doesn't mean much -- as someone else pointed out earlier in the thread, from that point on SF scored four times -- whereas when a game is tied it's not just a case of hazy psychological factors; teams will make very different strategic decisions.

I don't feel super strongly about any of this, but if you told me Campbell had to kick once and go for it once, I would say go early, kick late
 

Anyway, back to my point: we weren't arguing about analytics or intuition. You were saying that momentum exists, and my point was that, even if it did, why would it argue in favor of one decision or another, since any decision you make could cause some sort of momentum swing?
Because momentum swings can vary in magnitude based on the outcome(s) of a single decision

For example, I don't think anyone would argue that a missed FG would have generated some positive momentum for the 49ers. But not nearly as much as what the 4th down defensive stop created.
 

Anyway, back to my point: we weren't arguing about analytics or intuition. You were saying that momentum exists, and my point was that, even if it did, why would it argue in favor of one decision or another, since any decision you make could cause some sort of momentum swing?
Because momentum swings can vary in magnitude based on the outcome(s) of a single decision

For example, I don't think anyone would argue that a missed FG would have generated some positive momentum for the 49ers. But not nearly as much as what the 4th down defensive stop created.
Again, why are you only focusing on negative momentum? Why would the momentum created by the stop be more than the momentum generated by a successful conversion, especially considering that the latter was the more likely outcome?
 

I have to admit, with the way you entered the discussion I was expecting something a lot better. This is just more of the same. :kicksrock: I could similarly make a bullet list of "human" reasons it clearly made sense to go for it. I won't, because that would be a waste of time, which I thought we were hoping to avoid.

(I did like how Purdy, who is like 22-4 for his career, "is not a 4th-quarter-comeback guy." I've heard a lot of criticisms of him, but that's a new one!)

Well, I'm used to disappointing people. It happens. But interestingly, you admitted you could have provided human factor reasons to go for it. So you are in agreement that the human factor can be important, and can actually sway an essential coin flip into what seems like a clear decision. We just disagree on whether those things existed. I appreciate you not refuting a single one, but admitting the human factor exists and can sway to one side or the other. That's quite validating.

I'm sure you know the difference between winning a game and coming back in the fourth quarter to win. So while I respect his record, I'm not sure how it relates to what I said about Purdy when he's trailing in the 4th. It wasn't a criticism as much as a human element to consider.

And, in truth, your responses are intentionally condescending and insulting to some posters here. It's clear either the topic is very sensitive for you...or being right is incredibly important to you. Since I share neither of those traits, I don't think I can add more to this dialogue with you.

Ironically, analytics suggest this could be a great discussion. But the human factor (your behavior) has made that more challenging. I think it helps prove my point, but you might disagree. Be well.
 
Here's an interesting question: Regardless of what you think Campbell should have done in the two fourth-down situations, which of the two do you think had a stronger case to go for it?

I heard someone arguing today that the first one was more questionable, which is funny because I had the exact opposite view.

First of all, that was my gut reaction in the moment: Up 14, keep your foot on the gas. Down three, tie the game up. But thinking about it a couple days later, I feel like the supposed psychological barrier of going up three scores doesn't mean much -- as someone else pointed out earlier in the thread, from that point on SF scored four times -- whereas when a game is tied it's not just a case of hazy psychological factors; teams will make very different strategic decisions.

I don't feel super strongly about any of this, but if you told me Campbell had to kick once and go for it once, I would say go early, kick late
Good question. I have to agree with you. You could argue that Campbell still had his swagger: Held the 49ers to a FG, drove the ball into FG territory, half the 3rd quarter already gone, up by two touchdowns. So instead of playing it safer on the road, he's going to do what he's always done. Didn't work out. And I think they still should have kicked, because three scores was significant. A made FG means after half a quarter...the 49ers made up no ground and were still down the same 17 points. Whatever they said at halftime has netted them nothing. That's demoralizing imo, and well worth the kick attempt.

Second time, everything was different. They were trailing, just half a quarter left, 49ers moving the ball better, and a FG ties it up. You go home if you lose, so erase the deficit! Take the three points! That one seems even more obvious.

Incidentally, I have no problem with the running play at the end, but you don't take a time out for any reason. Have two plays ready to go, and no-huddle your way into 4th down.
 
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Anyway, back to my point: we weren't arguing about analytics or intuition. You were saying that momentum exists, and my point was that, even if it did, why would it argue in favor of one decision or another, since any decision you make could cause some sort of momentum swing?
Because momentum swings can vary in magnitude based on the outcome(s) of a single decision

For example, I don't think anyone would argue that a missed FG would have generated some positive momentum for the 49ers. But not nearly as much as what the 4th down defensive stop created.
Again, why are you only focusing on negative momentum? Why would the momentum created by the stop be more than the momentum generated by a successful conversion, especially considering that the latter was the more likely outcome?
I think it's because the momentum was absolutely necessary for the 49ers, and the Lions just needed to keep it away from their opponent. Pizza tastes good, but if you're starving it's heaven. If you're feeling like a snack might be nice, it's just good. 49ers needed momentum, luck (the catch) turnovers and some Lions drives ending in no points to barely win. Lions just needed one of those circumstances to not happen. So the momentum (however we define it) meant a LOT more to the 49ers.
 

Anyway, back to my point: we weren't arguing about analytics or intuition. You were saying that momentum exists, and my point was that, even if it did, why would it argue in favor of one decision or another, since any decision you make could cause some sort of momentum swing?
Because momentum swings can vary in magnitude based on the outcome(s) of a single decision

For example, I don't think anyone would argue that a missed FG would have generated some positive momentum for the 49ers. But not nearly as much as what the 4th down defensive stop created.
Again, why are you only focusing on negative momentum? Why would the momentum created by the stop be more than the momentum generated by a successful conversion, especially considering that the latter was the more likely outcome?
I think it's because the momentum was absolutely necessary for the 49ers, and the Lions just needed to keep it away from their opponent. Pizza tastes good, but if you're starving it's heaven. If you're feeling like a snack might be nice, it's just good.
I guess that makes sense if you believe in factoring momentum into decision making (which I still don't). But what you're really talking about is risk tolerance. I think everyone agrees that you generally want to take on more risk when you're behind and less when you're ahead. The question is where you draw the line. If the Lions came out in the second half and ran the ball on every play to chew up the clock, we would all recognize that as counterproductive. And at the other end, you would obviously be more likely to take the points and make it a three score game if there were two minutes left. But Campbell elected to keep his foot on the gas in the third quarter because he believed (correctly as it turned out) that their lead wasn't safe and the 49ers were fully capable of erasing a 17-point deficit. It's a philosophical question, and there's no way to say for sure if it was right or wrong, especially given that the numbers were inconclusive
49ers needed momentum, luck (the catch) turnovers and some Lions drives ending in no points to barely win. Lions just needed one of those circumstances to not happen. So the momentum (however we define it) meant a LOT more to the 49ers.
It's funny you say that. I don't think Detroit's collapse was nearly as horrific as Atlanta's in the SB, but I remember saying a version of what you said after that game. In order for the Falcons to lose, so many things had to break against them. The Pats had the Edelman catch and two 2PCs and won the coin toss in OT. The Falcons had the strip sack and the holding call to knock them out of FG range after the amazing Julio catch and probably some other things I'm forgetting. If any one of those had gone the other way, there's a good chance Atlanta wins.

My takeaway from that realization was to be more Zen about criticizing Quinn or Shanahan or anyone and chalk it up to the Swiss Cheese Effect. But I get why some would have the opposite reaction and zero in on individual decisions which they could plausibly claim cost the Falcons the game.

Incidentally, one of the key plays of that game was also a question of risk tolerance. On the strip sack, Shanny dialed up a bomb and had a WR open behind the secondary for what would likely have been a game-icing TD, but Freeman whiffed on the blitz pickup and Hightower sacked Ryan before he could get the pass off. Was that play call an unnecessary risk or a smart attempt to deliver a kill shot that resulted in the worst-case scenario coming to pass? It's impossible to answer, other than to say that it didn't work out
 
What gives the team a better chance to win the game; a successful fg putting the team up 17 with 6:28 left in the 3rd or a successful fg putting the team up 17 with 4:00 left in the 3rd? That encapsulates just one of the positive momentum builds inherent in a 4th down conversion. The receiver holds on to the ball and Detroit is chalk full of momentum while the 49ers are reeling.
 
What gives the team a better chance to win the game; a successful fg putting the team up 17 with 6:28 left in the 3rd or a successful fg putting the team up 17 with 4:00 left in the 3rd? That encapsulates just one of the positive momentum builds inherent in a 4th down conversion. The receiver holds on to the ball and Detroit is chalk full of momentum while the 49ers are reeling.
But the receiver didn't hold onto the ball. That's the whole point. There was an oppty to go up 17 with 6:28 in the 3rd; there wasn't an oppty at 4:00. So the choice of the two is fictional.
 
What gives the team a better chance to win the game; a successful fg putting the team up 17 with 6:28 left in the 3rd or a successful fg putting the team up 17 with 4:00 left in the 3rd? That encapsulates just one of the positive momentum builds inherent in a 4th down conversion. The receiver holds on to the ball and Detroit is chalk full of momentum while the 49ers are reeling.
But the receiver didn't hold onto the ball. That's the whole point. There was an oppty to go up 17 with 6:28 in the 3rd; there wasn't an oppty at 4:00. So the choice of the two is fictional.
The fg was missed
 
Anyway, back to my point: we weren't arguing about analytics or intuition. You were saying that momentum exists, and my point was that, even if it did, why would it argue in favor of one decision or another, since any decision you make could cause some sort of momentum swing?
I think the reason it matters is because the outcome doesn't provide equal momentum swings. Just as @Neil Beaufort Zod pointed out with his pizza example, the momentum gain by picking up the 4th down at that point in the game with that lead wasn't as big of a swing in overall momentum as the gain the 49ers would receive by stopping Detroit from picking up the first down. So part of the choice that should factor into the decision to go for it is what kind of swing in momentum could occur if we don't get the 1st down. Is that gain by your opponent worth the risk of going for it over attempting the FG?

Lets say momentum has a scale of 100% Detroit all the way to 100% SF and it's a sliding scale. So if at the point of the decision for the 4th down attempt I would estimate that the point of momentum on the scale was at 45% on the Detroit side of zero. SF had just kicked a FG after a decent drive to bring it to a two score game. Det still had control but SF was gaining ground on the MoScale. By my estimations going for the 4th down and getting it would slide the scale to 50% Det....a 5% gain. On the other hand, a 4th down stop would be a 40% gain by SF bringing the scale all the way down to 5% Det. They would still have the lead by two scores but a big ***** in the armor occurred as the SF defense showed they could hold the offense that gambles and wins at 75% on 4th and 3 on the year. Big Win for SF. As a coach the law of diminishing returns comes into play and while the analytics shows a slight advantage in EV to go for it, it gets outweighed by the downside of not making it as it gives SF a boost that I would want to stay away from.

Compare that the FG attempt. Det is at the same 45% on the scale and I would say making a FG increases the MoScale by 2% while missing it would be be bigger for SF but not as big as a 4th down spot. Because the defense did hold them....the didn't really stop them. So I would put that MoScale adjustment to a swing of 20% shifting the scale to Det at 25%.

Now in order to quantify these analytics we would need to go over play of every game and decide on an average percentage point gain/loss for every scenario there is. Bring in psychologists, ex players, coaches, fans (because fans do contribute to momentum) to figure out how this calculates out. You would need to know each players internal drive/emotion etc. It would be interesting if it could be done. I think this is what the analytics side is trying to get at. How do you quantify this swing for each outcome so it can go into a mathematical formula to come up with an ultimate "right" decision tree. But because there are 100's of humans involved in this it makes the variables incredibly hard to quantify. Each human's makeup is different so there isn't a way to know how much confidence (momentum) a stop gives to SF vs loss of confidence to Det. It's very complicated for sure. But it does exist.

NOTE: Percentages in the example are estimated based on nothing but my football viewing/playing experiences over the years. It did not include any actual historical data. No animals were harmed in these studies.
 
Another interesting stat to consider. Detroit's kicker Badgley is only 62 percent from beyond 40 yards in an outdoor stadium. The idea of 'taking the points' is utter BS. Shaq shot 62 percent in 2002 from the free throw line.
 
Another interesting stat to consider. Detroit's kicker Badgley is only 62 percent from beyond 40 yards in an outdoor stadium. The idea of 'taking the points' is utter BS. Shaq shot 62 percent in 2002 from the free throw line.
The fg is never missed in this scenario, that line of thinking gums up the narrative.
"Take the points" should probably be changed to "attempt to take the points".
 

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